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Issues and Recommendations 
Cuba “Updates” Its Economic Model 
Perspectives for Cooperation with the European Union 
The thaw in relations between Cuba and the United 
States has created a new political and economic basis 
for integrating the Cuban economy more closely into 
international trade and investment flows. The great 
interest in closer cooperation shared by Cuba itself, 
the governments of the industrialised nations and 
the business sector raises the question of opportuni-
ties for cooperation with the EU and Germany poten-
tially arising through the transformation of the Cuban 
model. Are the reforms initiated in Cuba suited to 
transform the country’s external position? And do they 
improve the situation for collaboration with the Euro-
pean private sector, and/or for development coopera-
tion? Cuba’s current trade situation and its embed-
ding in the WTO and regional trade agreements also 
represent cornerstones for future developments. An-
other question of interest is the extent to which the 
German-Cuban declaration of 2015 and the 2016 EU-
Cuba Cooperation Agreement offer a perspective for 
the EU to return to a united policy on Cuba, after a 
long period in which member states have pursued 
different positions. 
Cuba has struck a new economic course since Raúl 
Castro succeeded his brother Fidel as head of state and 
party leader. Raúl believes that the causes of Cuba’s 
economic difficulties are largely of its own making. 
The “guidelines” (lineamientos) for updating the coun-
try’s economic model adopted in response in 2011 
set the scene for sweeping changes. The central trade 
policy objectives are to diversify and expand exports, 
and to substitute imports. The thrust of the latter is 
principally to improve the country’s self-sufficiency 
in energy and food. Cuba is also seeking greater inde-
pendence from Venezuela, which has been a crucial 
supporter but is now mired in economic and political 
difficulties of its own. 
While the reforms also introduced a legal possibil-
ity for self-employment (cuentapropistas), the narrow 
restraints under which it currently operates offer little 
prospect of meaningful opportunities for diversifica-
tion or expansion of exports. In tourism, however, 
the reforms could have a wider impact. The growing 
number of cooperatives, especially in agriculture, has 
thus far yielded only small increases in productivity 
and is more likely – starting from a low baseline – to 
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contribute to import substitution. Growth in exports 
can only be expected in the longer term, if at all. 
However, all these possibilities depend strongly on 
whether the Cuban government realises accompany-
ing reforms in the areas of infrastructure and produc-
tion-related services. The most decisive aspect of all 
will be whether businesses and cooperatives are given 
greater entrepreneurial freedom on questions ranging 
from recruitment and pay to import needs. Tight gov-
ernment control creates negative framework condi-
tions for internal actors and external investors alike, 
and undermines Havana’s external economic objec-
tives. The restrictions are driven by the government’s 
wish to control all economic activities and the politi-
cal-military elite’s desire to secure its own power and 
wealth. Great tensions thus exist between political 
circumstances and external economic goals. 
Today the European Union possesses significant 
weight in relation to improving Cuba’s external eco-
nomic perspectives, as the country’s second-largest 
trade partner after Venezuela. But conversely, Cuba 
is economically insignificant for Europe, even if a 
number of multinationals from EU member states 
have larger investments there. In 2016 Cuba concluded 
a Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, 
as the last Latin American country to do so. Although 
Cuba is geographically part of the Caribbean, and 
partially included in the region’s political institutions, 
it stands outside the EU’s formal ties with that region; 
this applies both to development funding and to the 
EU’s Economic Partnership Agreement with the Carib-
bean which came into force in 2008. Unlike other 
developing countries, Cuba is excluded from the EU’s 
non-reciprocal trade preferences, because a strongly 
overvalued exchange rate inflates its GDP figures. 
While the future course of European-Cuban rela-
tions will thus be shaped by a complex web of eco-
nomic and political conditions, a number of conclu-
sions and recommendations for Germany and the EU 
can nonetheless be identified: 
 The prominence accorded to Cuba in current debates 
exceeds its relevance for European economic/stra-
tegic interests. Germany and the EU should reassess 
whether special treatment for Cuba actually corre-
sponds to their current interests, or whether it 
sends the wrong message to other Caribbean states. 
 Cuba’s economic and political anchoring in the 
region should be the starting point for its inclusion 
in the German and European instruments of devel-
opment and trade policy towards CARICOM and 
the Dominican Republic (which together form 
CARIFORUM). This would also strengthen long-term 
regional cooperation and integration. This could at 
the same time test new forms of cooperation with 
Cuba and potentially facilitate dialogue on sensitive 
issues; in the external economic context for example 
on the role of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). 
 Circumstances are especially difficult for European 
SMEs. The German and European Cuba dialogue 
needs to be flanked by regular stakeholder discus-
sions with the business sector, academia and civil 
society. This would help the German government 
and the European Commission to stay fully in-
formed about the situation and activities of groups 
in Cuban society. 
 The EU should use its cooperation agreement with 
Cuba – and Germany its bilateral agreement – to 
intensify dialogue on the issues of human rights, 
transparency and participation. These questions are 
closely bound up with the possibilities for achiev-
ing external economic goals, as they define the 
framework for economic activity. Cuba’s need for 
external economic successes also offers openings 
for addressing politically sensitive topics. 
 In the longer term, closer cooperation under the 
agreement with the EU will hopefully offer a chance 
to move towards more substantial European-Cuban 
arrangements, including in the area of economic 
relations and to further concretise the current 
agreement at some future point. 
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Starting Situation: Updating the Cuban Model as the 
Basis for Dynamic Growth? 
 
Basic data 
Cuba has a population of 11 million (2015) and annual 
per-capita income of $5,880,1 officially making it a 
higher middle income country. In economic terms, it 
does not stand out especially in the region; per-capita 
income and population are nominally on a par with 
neighbouring Dominican Republic. But the Cuban ex-
change rate is strongly overvalued: alongside the con-
vertible peso (CUC), which is tied to the US dollar at 
CUC24/$1, there is also a Cuban peso (CUP) with an 
exchange rate of 1:1. At an exchange rate of 12 pesos/ 
$1, which observers regard as realistic,2 Cuba’s per-
capita income would be much lower. De facto, Cuba 
should be regarded as one of the poorer developing 
countries. 
To arrive at a proper assessment of Cuba’s perspec-
tives, however, one must examine the data at more 
granular level. Unlike other low-income developing 
countries, Cuba has very positive social indicators. The 
investments made after the revolution of 1959, above 
all in education, health and basic infrastructure, are 
still reflected in a high level of social development 
today. The UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) 
ranks Cuba’s sixty-seventh globally, with high life ex-
pectancy (79.5 years), long school education (11.5 years) 
and good access to water and sanitation (for 94 and 93 
percent of the population respectively).3 That said, a 
more realistic exchange rate would also lower the HDI 
by reducing per-capita income. Cuba scores less well 
on other indicators, such as communications (2014: 
22 mobile phones and 30 internet users per 100 
population). But the telecommunications situation 
is changing rapidly; the number of mobile phones 
 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all data in this section from 
World Bank, World Development Indicators, Cuba, http://data. 
worldbank.org/country/cuba (accessed 23 June 2016). 
2 Mauricio De Miranda-Parrondo, “Current Problems in 
the Cuban Economy and Necessary Reforms”, in No More Free 
Lunch: Reflections on the Cuban Economic Reform Process and Chal-
lenges for Transformation, ed. Claes Brundenius and Ricardo 
Torres Pérez (Cham, Germany, et al., 2013), 41–62 (42). 
3 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human 
Development Report 2015, http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI 
(accessed 30 March 2016). 
passed three million in 2015.4 This trend has been 
fostered by a sectoral trade opening, with US firms 
permitted to supply telecommunications equipment 
since January 2015. At the same time, state controls 
remain strong, especially in relation to internet usage. 
Cuba’s real economic growth in 2015 was 4.3 per-
cent.5 For 2016–2020 the Economist Intelligence Unit 
expects an annual average of 5.1 percent.6 But a string 
of factors could force a downwards correction: low oil 
prices, crisis in Venezuela and uncertainty over the 
direction of US Cuba policy under Donald Trump. The 
normalisation of American-Cuban relations has been 
a factor contributing to recent positive expectations 
among political analysts and business actors. 
After taking over as leader in 2006, Raúl Castro 
initiated a policy of reforms, spurred by a reassess-
ment of the causes of Cuba’s economic crisis. While 
Fidel Castro largely blamed the American embargo, 
Raúl identifies structural problems that needs to be 
tackled through internal change.7 As such he is also 
addressing the challenge of fulfilling shifting internal 
popular expectations in relation to the legitimisation 
of the government. The likelihood of social protests is 
also expected to increase after Raúl Castro leaves the 
stage, as the last of the veterans of the revolution.8 
Comparisons with the pre-revolutionary era play little 
role for young Cubans today, who judge their govern-
ment on the basis of its actual achievements. This 
places Havana under growing pressure to demonstrate 
economic successes. 
The normalisation of American-Cuban relations, 
initiated in 2014 by President Barack Obama, enabled 
 
4 Germany Trade and Invest (GTAI), Wirtschaftstrends Kuba 
Jahresmitte 2015, 11. 
5 UNCTADSTAT, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/ 
GeneralProfile/en-GB/192/index.html (accessed 31 January 2017). 
6 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Cuba: Country Report, 
March 2016, http://country.eiu.com/FileHandler.ashx?issue_ 
id=1094025693&mode=pdf (accessed 10 January 2017). 
7 Uwe Optenhögel, “‘Wer zu spät kommt, den belohnt das 
Leben’: Fünf Fragen zur EU-Kubapolitik und den Folgen der 
Reformen an Uwe Optenhögel in Brüssel”, Internationale Politik 
und Gesellschaft, 24 March 2015, http://www.ipg-journal.de/ 
interviews/artikel/wer-zu-spaet-kommt-den-belohnt-das-leben-
852/ (accessed 4 January 2017). 
8 EIU, Cuba: Country Report, 11 June 2015. 
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Cuba to reorientate its external economic and foreign 
policies. After decades of dependency on single part-
ners – until the revolution the United States, later the 
USSR, then Venezuela – Cuba today possesses great 
interest in diversifying its economic and political ex-
ternal relations. Havana’s active diplomacy, initiated 
through the Cuban-American thaw and reflected in 
numerous visits by high-ranking foreign guests, 
must be seen in that context. It remains unclear how 
Donald Trump’s presidency will affect Cuba’s nascent 
integration into international politics. 
Updating the economic model 2011/2016 
The Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba 
in April 2011 adopted a series of reform proposals, 
consolidated into a single comprehensive document;9 
the Seventh Congress in 2016 amended and expanded 
them.10 As the introductory sentence of 2011 
underlines, the guidelines are intended to “update 
Cuba’s economic model with the objective of 
guaranteeing the continuation and irreversibility of 
socialism, as well as fostering the country’s economic 
development and improving the standard of living of 
the population…”.11 These formulations reveal that the 
point of the exercise is by no means a fundamental 
overhaul of the economic system, but merely to 
implement reforms that appear unavoidable for 
achieving social and economic targets within the 
socialist economic model. 
Under the guidelines, “socialist property of the 
entire people” (propiedad socialista de todo el pueblo) 
remains the foundation of the economic system. But 
 
9 VI Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC), Linea-
mientos de La Política Económica y Social del Partido y La Revolución, 
Aprobado El 18 de Abril de 2011, “Año 53 de la Revolución” [Sixth 
Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, guidelines for 
economic and social policy for the party and the revolution, 
adopted 18 April 2011 in the 53rd year of the revolution]. 
Referred to as “guidelines” in the following. 
10 VII Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC), 
Actualización de Los Lineamientos de La Política Económica y Social 
Del Partido y La Revolución para El Periodo 2016–2021, Aprobados 
En El 7mo. Congreso Del Partido en Abril de 2016 y por La Asamblea 
Nacional del Poder Popular en Julio de 2016 [Seventh Congress of 
the Communist Party of Cuba, guidelines for economic and 
social policy for the party and the revolution for the period 
2016–2021, adopted at the Seventh Party Congress in April 
2016 and by the National Assembly of People’s Power in July 
2016, http://www.cubadebate.cu/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
09/aqu%C3%AD.pdf (accessed 1 February 2017). 
11 Translated from the Spanish. 
certain elements of private entrepreneurship are now 
to be permitted, including foreign investment, coopera-
tives, small-scale agriculture, leasing and certain types 
of self-employment (trabajadores por cuenta propia or 
cuentapropistas).12 It is hoped that these innovations 
will contribute to increasing efficiency and improving 
Cuba’s balance of payments. 
The scope of newly legalised self-employment is 
limited largely to unqualified functions in the service 
sector. One example is buying and selling second-hand 
books – “Activity No. 23” – which is widely practised at 
Havana’s tourist hotspots; “Activity No. 49” regulates 
the work of covering buttons with fabric.13 In order to 
promote self-employment, it has been made easier for 
Cubans to receive funds from abroad and invest them 
in private activities. Political analysts note that these 
changes are contributing to a strong increase in in-
equality in Cuban society, where access to convertible 
currency has become the key to social status. The 
losers are above all those who lack connections to the 
Cuban diaspora in the United States – pensioners, 
large parts of the rural population, single mothers and 
Afro-Cubans.14 
Legislation passed at the end of 2012 permits 
cooperatives in the retail and service sectors, include-
ing the transformation of state-owned restaurants into 
cooperatives with up to twenty members (who must 
be former staff). The government has decided to lease 
the 8,948 state-owned restaurants to private opera-
tors.15 The legislation also permits IT experts to join 
together to offer web design, internet and other ser-
vices, as well as cooperatives of architects, accountants 
and consultants.16 Transport cooperatives will, it is 
hoped, in particular expedite the distribution of agri-
cultural products.17 By May 2014, 498 cooperatives 
 
12 In the following “self-employment”. 
13 José Azel, “The Illusion of Cuban Reform: Castro 
Strikes Out”, World Affairs, July/August 2013, http://www. 
worldaffairsjournal.org/article/illusion-cuban-reform-castro-
strikes-out (accessed 10 January 2017). 
14 Jenny Morín Nenoff, “Kubanische Perspektiven”, ameri-
ka21: Nachrichten und Analysen aus Lateinamerika, 15 February 
2015, https://amerika21.de/analyse/112143/kubanische-
perspektiven (accessed 10 January 2017). 
15 Mimi Whitefield, “Building the New Cuban Economy”, 
Miami Herald, 13 December 2014, http://www.miamiherald.com/ 
news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article4458040. html 
(accessed 10 January 2017). 
16 Archibald R. M. Ritter and Ted A. Henken, Entrepreneurial 
Cuba: The Changing Policy Landscape (Boulder, Col., 2015), 190. 
17 Julia E. Sweig and Michael J. Bustamante, “Cuba after 
Communism: The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming 
the Island”, Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 (2013): 101–14 (109). 
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had been approved, of which 329 were already 
operating, with another 300 applications pending.18 
Cooperative modes of production already existed 
in Cuban agriculture. By the end of 2010 one million 
hectares of productive land had already been trans-
ferred to 108,000 individuals and 2,000 cooperatives.19 
In 2015 about 80 percent of agricultural production 
(but not consumption, it must be noted) originated 
from cooperatives.20 The legalisation of private-sector 
activities has succeeded in increasing food production, 
with the largest gains recorded for products whose 
sale at farmers’ markets has been legalised, and for 
those whose production is state-supported. But in 
international comparison Cuba’s agricultural produc-
tivity remains very low.21 
Controlled “freedom” – 
The dilemma of the update 
The Cuban government prioritises “law, discipline 
and control” over the development of small business-
es, as Raúl Castro underlined in a speech in December 
2013.22 The emergence of forms of private ownership 
represents a great challenge for the socialist model 
with its principle of equality. At the same time, the 
political ruling class fears the possibility of losing con-
trol over the economy. The Cuban economist Antonio 
Gómez from the University of Havana points out that 
the guidelines introduced ideas of efficiency and eco-
nomic sustainability for the first time, whereas in 
earlier decades social development clearly enjoyed 
priority over economic aspects.23 Social equality and 
 
18 Whitefield, “Building the New Cuban Economy” (see 
note 15), quoting Cuban Economy Minister Marino Murillo. 
19 Angel Bu Wong and Pablo Fernández Dominguez, “Agri-
culture: Historical Transformations and Future Directions”, 
in Cuban Economists on the Cuban Economy, ed. Al Campbell 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2013), 270–91 (283). 
20 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
“UN Agency Head Visits Cuba to Discuss Agriculture Reform 
with High-level Government Officials” (Rome, 7 May 2015), 
https://www.ifad.org/en/newsroom/press_release/tags/p31/ 
y2015/7487627 (accessed 10 January 2017). 
21 Anicia García Álvarez, “Cuba’s Agricultural Sector and Its 
External Links”, in Cuban Economic and Social Development: Policy 
Reforms and Challenges in the 21st Century, ed. Jorge I. Domín-
guez, Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, Mayra Espina Prieto 
and Lorena Barbería (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 2012), 
137–92 (147, 150). 
22 Ritter and Henken, Entrepreneurial Cuba (see note 16). 
23 Antonio F. Romero Gómez, Transformaciones Económicas y 
Cambios Institucionales en Cuba [Economic transformation and 
the impact of innovations on different parts of society, 
however, remain a fundamental issue for the long-term 
success of the reforms. In this connection the econo-
mist Oscar Fernández Estrada argues that taxes alone 
are an inadequate instrument for preventing the accu-
mulation of wealth in particular sectors. When power 
is transferred to companies, he argues, new mecha-
nisms are needed to ensure that workers are able to 
influence company decisions.24 
The self-employed in Cuba are currently taxed 
considerably more heavily than joint ventures, with 
effective tax rates of up to 100 percent.25 On the other 
hand, small businesses with fewer than five employees 
are taxed considerably less heavily than larger firms. 
The scope for private business activities is defined by 
politically driven administrative rules, which are not 
necessarily logical. Arbitrary limits on the number of 
seats in private restaurants supplies one example: at 
first it was twelve, then twenty, and now fifty are per-
mitted. Customer interests and economic success are 
irrelevant. Manuel Orozco from the US non-profit 
Cuba Study Group points out, for instance, that an 
individual may open a restaurant, but not a food-
producing firm.26 Moreover, a food business needs to 
employ staff with a wide range of qualifications in 
order to fulfil all the legal requirements: cooks, health 
experts, marketing specialists, food buyers and account-
ants. Another reason why self-employment initially 
remained limited was the lack of credit and the ab-
sence of wholesale suppliers. In the meantime, retail 
and wholesale markets have emerged since 2014,27 
also simplifying access to resources for the rapidly-
growing private restaurant sector. More emphasis is 
given to the financial sector and lending, in turn, 
under the revised guidelines of 2016.28 
 
institutional change in Cuba], Foreign Policy at Brookings 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, August 2014), 22. 
24 Oscar Fernández Estrada, “The Economic Transformation 
Process in Cuba after 2011”, in No More Free Lunch, ed. Brun-
denius and Pérez (see note 2), 23–39 (26). 
25 Ritter and Henken, Entrepreneurial Cuba (see note 16). 
26 Cited in Collin Laverty, Cuba’s New Resolve: Economic Reform 
and Its Implications for U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Democracy in the Americas, 2011), 64. 
27 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “Can Cuba’s Economic Reforms Suc-
ceed?” Americas Quarterly (Americas Society/Council of the 
Americas), 5 November 2014, http://www.americasquarterly. 
org/content/can-cubas-economic-reforms-succeed (accessed 
8 June 2015). 
28 VII Congreso del PCC, Conceptualización del Modelo Económico 
y Social Cubano de Desarrollo Socialista [Seventh Congress of 
the CPC, conceptualisation of the Cuban economic and social 
model of socialist development], 2016, http://www.granma. 
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The individual measures have come into effect 
more slowly than the leadership itself had expected, 
because the government is concerned to keep the 
repercussions under control and limit negative social 
impacts. In fact, according to the government, only 21 
percent of the reforms had been implemented by early 
2016.29 Originally self-employment was supposed to 
absorb surplus state employees, with 500,000 redun-
dancies originally planned for the first half of 2011 
under the update process. In view of the slow growth 
of self-employment, part of the redundancies were 
postponed to the end of 2015.30 De facto 365,000 state 
employees had been shed by the end of 2012, reducing 
the state’s share of total employment from 82 percent 
to 75 percent.31 By the end of 2014 the number of self-
employed had risen to approximately 500,000.32 But 
this still fell well short of the target of 1.8 million set 
for 2015.33 
In any case, self-employment is not necessarily 
suited for absorbing surplus workers. At the end of 
2011, contrary to expectations, only 18 percent of the 
new self-employed were redundant state employees.34 
This is in fact unsurprising, given that the qualifica-
tions of those shed by state-run enterprises do not 
necessarily match the requirements of the private 
sector. The result is the emergence of growing hidden 
(unregistered) unemployment. The early reform pro-
cess also drew criticism for failing to strike an appro-
priate balance between economic adjustment and 
social support.35 
As well as creating new jobs, self-employment 
under the “cuentapropistas” arrangements has had 
other positive effects on the Cuban economy and for-
eign investment. It serves, namely, to a certain extent, 
to legalise the existing shadow economy, with the new 
self-employed coming largely from the informal sec-
 
cu/file/pdf/gaceta/Copia%20para%20el%20Sitio%20Web.pdf 
(accessed 1 February 2017). 
29 VII Congreso del PCC, Actualización de Los Lineamientos 
(see note 10), 4. 
30 Ritter and Henken, Entrepreneurial Cuba (see note 16), 280. 
31 Mesa-Lago, “Can Cuba’s Economic Reforms Succeed?” 
(see note 27). 
32 “Cuba’s Economy at a Crossroads”, New York Times, 14 De-
cember 2014. 
33 Mesa-Lago, “Can Cuba’s Economic Reforms Succeed?” 
(see note 27). 
34 De Miranda-Parrondo, “Current Problems in the Cuban 
Economy and Necessary Reforms” (see note 2), 53. 
35 Alberto Gabriele and Pavel Vidal Alejandro, “Cuban Re-
forms at a Crossroads”, in The Economy of Cuba after the VI Party 
Congress, ed. Alberto Gabriele (New York, 2012), 131–48 (141). 
tor. Archibald Ritter and Ted Henken cite examples 
from the catering sector where people had in fact been 
self-employed for years. At the beginning they were 
legal, but went underground when the rules were 
tightened; now these individuals see an opportunity 
to legalise their business again.36 The informal sector 
plays a major role in Cuba, and significantly interferes 
with the activities of foreign investors. 
The shadow economy is in fact crucial to the sur-
vival of the Cuban economy as a whole. On the one 
hand it ensures that certain important services are 
provided at all; on the other it indirectly supports the 
state system. While not yielding tax revenues directly, 
hard currency earned in the shadow economy and 
spent at the official exchange rate functions as in-
direct taxation. At the same time, significant sections 
of the population have no alternative to seeking in-
come outside of formal sector, because their earnings 
from regular employment are insufficient to cover 
their living costs.37 So although self-employment con-
strains the state’s ability to direct the economy, the 
partial formalisation of the existing shadow economy 
actually expands its control over economic activity 
and increases tax revenues. The proliferation of co-
operative models could also contribute to a gradual 
undermining of the shadow economy and formali-
sation of an important section of the economy. A 
broader cooperative sector in the non-agricultural 
sphere could, namely, lead to a change in workers’ 
attitudes. The widespread workplace problem of “petty 
theft” of socialist collective property might plausibly 
find less acceptance in cooperatives, where the work-
ers own the business themselves.38 Workplace thefts 
are, however, also an important economic input for 
the informal sector. 
There is good reason to expect a string of positive 
effects from the currently permitted forms of self-
employment, but also a risk of productive energy 
being directed into low-productivity niches rather 
than sectors with high added value. This is because 
self-employment has been legalised largely for un-
qualified jobs in limited areas, while the state funda-
mentally intends to retain tight control of economic 
 
36 Ritter and Henken, Entrepreneurial Cuba (see note 16). 
37 Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, “The Cuban Economy: 
An Evaluation and Proposals for Necessary Policy Changes”, 
in Cuban Economic and Social Development, ed. Domínguez et al. 
(see note 21), 21–38 (36). 
38 Ritter and Henken, Entrepreneurial Cuba (see note 16), 191. 
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development.39 The new economic incentives created 
by the guidelines have led to a phenomenon of highly 
qualified workers taking menial jobs – especially in 
the tourism sector – in order to earn hard currency. 
While university graduates comprise only 7 percent 
of the self-employed, they are also doing low-qualified 
subsistence-orientated jobs. This is one of the reasons 
why Cuba’s high level of education – which is better 
than in most developing countries – is not properly 
reflected in its economic performance.40 
The extent to which the implemented measures 
will actually contribute to economic development and 
foreign trade will naturally also depend on whether 
the changes are lasting. This is particularly pertinent 
given that possibilities for private business were opened 
and closed again several times under Fidel Castro. First, 
the “revolutionary offensive” of 1968 almost completely 
abolished private forms of economic activity. In 1978, 
forty-eight categories of self-employment were legal-
ised, but severely curtailed again in 1986. The deterio-
rating economic situation in 1993 forced another 
legalisation of various private activities, but this only 
lasted until 1995/1996.41 Despite this record, experts 
today believe that the reforms under Raúl Castro will 
endure,42 above all on account of the economic neces-
sity, especially the loss of economic aid from Vene-
zuela. The credibility of Raúl Castro’s reforms is under-
lined by the self-critical analysis with which they were 
launched, which blamed Cuba’s desolate economic 
situation more on internal problems than on the US 
embargo and other external factors.43 
Yet fear that economic reforms could create politi-
cal difficulties is not the only reason behind heavy 
restrictions on private-sector activities. The military 
elite’s concern over potential economic losses also 
plays an important role. “The militarisation of eco-
nomic life and the levers of power – where state-owned 
enterprises are run by members of the military – is 
one of the measures introduced by Raúl Castro to 
manage and politically anchor the economic open-
 
39 Eric Hershberg, “Cuba: An Economy Careening Forward, 
Destination Unknown”, in No More Free Lunch, ed. Brundenius 
and Pérez (see note 2), v–ix (viii). 
40 This criticism is voiced both internally and internationally. 
See UNDP, Human Development Report (see note 3), or Gómez, 
Transformaciones Económicas (see note 23), 21. 
41 Ritter and Henken, Entrepreneurial Cuba (see note 16), 297ff. 
42 See Bert Hoffmann, Wie reformfähig ist Kubas Sozialismus? 
(Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, May 2011), 3; Laverty, Cuba’s 
New Resolve (see note 26), 60, or Ritter and Henken, Entrepre-
neurial Cuba (see note 16). 
43 Gabriele and Alejandro, “Cuban Reforms” (see note 35), 136. 
ing.”44 The military thus controls a large part of the 
economy,45 and has a strong interest in preserving its 
access to power and wealth. Implementation of the 
reform process is further hindered by other state func-
tionaries who profit from the existing system; they 
form a large group, because the state sector is large 
and lacking in transparency and clear rules.46 
The government’s desire to retain control of the 
central means of production is reflected in tight con-
straints, which in turn currently block the growth of 
SMEs. It is also problematic for economic development 
that such constraints do not apply to mixed foreign/ 
state joint ventures.47 Yet new SMEs would represent 
an important counterweight to the large state-run 
enterprises and military-owned combines (where there 
is a risk of the latter turning into at least semi-private 
monopolies). Rapid growth of the newly legalised 
cooperatives could be an especially rewarding route. 
While they already exist in many countries, coopera-
tives could attain greater significance in Cuba as the 
foundation of a “mixed cooperative market economy”,48 
which would be certain of global attention as an alter-
native model beyond socialism and capitalism. 
The changing internal conditions also create a basis 
for stimulating Cuba’s external economic relations, 
to the extent that the reforms contribute to improving 
efficiency and expanding production and supply (of 
services). However, the potential of self-employment 
presently lies above all in the field of tourism, and the 
tight restrictions make direct trade-related activities 
in self-employment almost unimaginable. Expansion 
of the cooperative sector, on the other hand, offers a 
route to ultimately also influence trade in goods. But 
creating further potential for expanding and trans-
forming foreign trade will require great improvements 
in the framework conditions for commerce and in-
vestment. 
 
44 Translated from Günther Maihold, Vom Sonderfall zur Nor-
malisierung: Kuba und die Europäische Union suchen erneut den Dia-
log, SWP-Aktuell 34/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, May 2014), 4. 
45 Azel, “The Illusion of Cuban Reform” (see note 13), cites 
60 percent. 
46 Gabriele and Alejandro, “Cuban Reforms” (see note 35), 143. 
47 Ritter and Henken, Entrepreneurial Cuba (see note 16), 302: 
“Of course, these same limitations do not exist for mixed or 
joint ventures between foreign owned and state enterprises – 
a disappointing feature of Cuba’s new foreign investment law 
published in 2014.” See also the discussion of investments in 
this study. 
48 Ibid. 
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Cuba’s External Economy 
 
Background 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a severe 
economic crisis, which Havana refers to as the “Special 
Period in Time of Peace” (período especial en tiempo de 
paz). In 2014 the average wage was still just 28 percent 
of the level achieved when Cuba was a member of 
Comecon.49 By the early 1990 there was no alternative 
to a restructuring of Cuba’s economy and trade, which 
until then had concentrated principally on exporting 
sugar, minerals and citrus fruit in the scope of the 
socialist division of labour.50 In order to fund the im-
ports it required – above all food and fuel – Cuba had 
to earn hard currency from new partners in the global 
markets. Two factors played an especially important 
role in this connection: relations with Venezuela and 
the deployment of medical teams in the scope of bi-
lateral agreements. 
The alliance between Havana and Caracas was initi-
ated by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. Under an 
agreement from the year 2000, Venezuela supplied 
Cuba with 115,000 barrels of oil per day until 2016. Of 
these, 92,000 barrels went to domestic consumption, 
covering about 60 percent of demand.51 The rest was 
refined and re-exported. It is estimated that the Vene-
zuelan oil deliveries contributed between 12 and 20 
percent of Cuban GDP.52 In return, Cuba exported 
health and education services to Venezuela. This part-
nership represented an important driver of the eco-
nomic growth Cuba has achieved since 2000. However, 
Venezuela’s oil deliveries have been falling off since 
2016, as the country faces grave economic difficulties 
of its own. In this situation, reducing dependency on 
Venezuelan oil has become a priority for the Cuban 
 
49 Whitefield, “Building the New Cuban Economy” (see note 15). 
50 On the history of Cuba’s external economy see Nancy 
A. Quiñones Chang, “Cuba’s Insertion in the International 
Economy since 1990”, in Cuban Economists on the Cuban Economy, 
ed. Campbell (see note 19), 89–113. 
51 Antonio F. Romero G., “Los Desafíos de las Relaciones Eco-
nómicas Externas de Cuba”, Cuban Studies (University of Pitts-
burgh Press) 44 (2016): 133–61 (141). 
52 “Cuba’s Economy: Caribbean Contagion: Venezuela’s 
Pneumonia Infects the Communist Island”, Economist, 23 July 
2016, 35. 
government. Amongst other things, Cuba plans to 
modernise and expand its own oil production with the 
help of Russian specialists, under an agreement with 
Russia concluded in 2014.53 At the same time, Cuba is 
seeking to reduce its high economic dependency on 
Venezuela – which ultimately succeeded its earlier de-
pendency on the Soviet Union. This is another reason 
why the guidelines aim to diversify the country’s im-
ports and exports. 
Foreign trade is an important political and economic 
factor. In 2015 exports of goods and services accounted 
for 30 percent of GDP.54 Cuba runs a large merchan-
dise trade deficit, with exports worth $4.4 billion ($0.8 
billion less than in 2014) as against imports estimated 
at $15.1 billion. Food and fuel imports are especially 
crucial for the Cuban economy, with strong import 
demand to date merely lowered by growth in the pri-
vate-sector. While the private sector today accounts for 
57 percent of food production while using only about 
25 percent of the agricultural land,55 about 80 percent 
of Cuba’s food needs are still imported (for about $2 
billion annually).56 Ironically, a large proportion of 
the imports come from the United States,57 which has 
exempted food from its embargo since 2000. 
Cuba’s inflated exchange rate has worsened its ex-
ternal imbalances in recent decades, by hampering 
exports and preventing import substitution. The guide-
lines identify merging the two different exchange rates 
as the central tool for reducing external imbalances. 
The details remain unclear, but the guidelines tie the 
measure to improvements in labour productivity. 
According to the party newspaper Granma, there is 
consensus that the Cuban peso (CUP) should be de-
valued against the US dollar and ultimately serve as 
 
53 “Russland hilft Kuba bei der Ölförderung und plant neuen 
Flughafen”, Cuba heute (blog), 1 March 2015, https://cubaheute. 
wordpress.com/2015/03/01/russland-hilft-kuba-bei-der-
olforderung-und-plant-neuen-flughafen/ (accessed 11 January 
2017). 
54 UNCTADSTAT, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/Country 
Profile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/192/index.html (accessed 
31 January 2017). 
55 Sweig and Bustamante, “Cuba after Communism” 
(see note 17), 106. 
56 IFAD, “UN Agency Head Visits Cuba” (see note 20). 
57 Ibid. 
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the country’s only currency. The government would 
like to see the rate move gradually towards CUP24/$1.58 
Currency adjustment appears to be occurring succes-
sively by sector.59 The most frequently applied rate is 
CUP10/$1 for hotels and in the sugar and biotech indus-
tries; this corresponds to a 90 percent devaluation.60 
However, such a sectoral approach is not only com-
plicated and associated with considerable bureaucracy; 
it is also problematic because it creates new distor-
tions within the economy. The World Bank therefore 
recommend unifying the two exchange rates at once 
and using subsidies and tax adjustments to neutralise 
the expected negative consequences – especially in-
flation.61 The International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank would normally support such a reform 
project, but that option is not open to Cuba. Although 
it was a founding member of the IMF in 1945, it with-
drew in 1964 ahead of a decision to deny it access to 
funds. It had already withdrawn from the World Bank 
in 1960.62 Progress towards merging the exchange 
rates has been very slow to date. The Economist Intel-
ligence Unit, which was initially very optimistic over 
the prospects for Cuban reforms, now no longer 
believes that a single exchange rate will be in place 
by 2020, as it had originally forecast.63 
Institutional framework: 
Trade as foreign policy 
The actors, institutions and legal frameworks that 
define Cuba’s trade flows differ strongly from those 
of a market economy. Under article 18 of the Cuban 
constitution of 1976 the state possesses a monopoly 
on foreign trade. The ultimate instance in this sphere 
is the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Investment (Minis-
 
58 Pavel Vidal Alejandro and Omar Everleny Pérez Villa-
nueva, La Reforma Monetaria en Cuba Hasta el 2016: Entre Gradua-
lidad y “Big Bang” [Currency reform in Cuba until 2016: Be-
tween incremental development and “big bang”] (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Brookings and University of Havana, December 
2013), 13. 
59 Ibid., 14. 
60 “Day Zero or D-Day? Cuba’s Economy (2)”, Economist, 
16 May 2015, 42. 
61 Augusto de la Torre and Alain Ize, Exchange Rate Unification: 
The Cuban Case (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, December 2013). 
62 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Barbara Kotschwar, Economic Nor-
malization with Cuba: A Roadmap for US Policymakers (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
2014), 63. 
63 EIU, Cuba: Country Report, 14 July 2016, 2. 
terio del Comercio Exterior y la Inversión Extranjera, 
MINCEX). Foreign trade is conducted through state-
licensed import-export companies. The number of 
such firms fluctuates: in 2003, following a period of 
expansion, there were almost five hundred operating 
actively. But the government subsequently withdrew 
numerous licences and tightened controls.64 By 2005 
there were just eighty-nine involved in foreign trade; 
since 2009 the scope and structure of imports has been 
determined by centralised planning mechanisms.65 
Cuban imports are regulated by state instances, 
which make their decisions on the basis of political as 
well as economic considerations. Foreign firms inter-
ested in exporting to Cuba have to pass through a 
complicated approval process before being listed as 
a supplier by a licensed import company.66 And even 
then, a series of factors influences whether orders are 
actually made. As well as the availability of hard cur-
rency, political objectives such as trade diversification 
also play a role. Germany Trade and Invest (GTAI) 
reports that Cuban companies that already enjoy good 
supplier relationships often have no interest in new 
vendors. To the chagrin of US businesses, state control 
also hampers trade between Cuba and the United States. 
Although new opportunities for US exports have arisen 
– for example through the Cuban state withdrawing 
from housing construction and the Obama adminis-
tration permitting the export of construction materials, 
car parts and agricultural machinery to the Cuban 
private sector – the Cuban state import agency has 
authorised only one hundred import deals in this con-
text. “I hoped that within a year there’d be a dozen ex-
port agents in Miami,” one American official is quoted, 
“but we haven’t really seen that.”67 This, he said, left 
Cuban importers dependent on the “Samsonite mar-
ket” – anything that can be transported home in a 
suitcase. 
Furthermore, the Cuban market often places spe-
cial demands on products, such as ease of operation, 
resistance to power outage, or the possibility of main-
tenance by local workers. It is not always easy for high-
technology suppliers from countries like Germany and 
 
64 GTAI, Tipps für das Kubageschäft, 9, http://www.havanna. 
diplo.de/contentblob/4152386/Daten/5369430/tipps_fuer_ 
kubageschaeft.pdf (accessed 11 January 2017). 
65 Chang, “Cuba’s Insertion in the International Economy 
since 1990” (see note 50), 100f. 
66 GTAI, Tipps für das Kubageschäft (see note 64), 10. 
67 “Lots of Diplomacy, Not Many Dollars”, Economist, 12 De-
cember 2015. 
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the United States to satisfy such criteria.68 This makes 
Cuba an especially interesting market for exporters 
from developing countries, which face similar con-
ditions in their home markets and are therefore better 
positioned to meet such expectations. 
Cuba’s membership of the World Trade Organisa-
tion defines a basic institutional framework. In 1947 
Cuba was among the first signatories of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the precursor 
of the WTO.69 Imports are subject to the external tar-
iffs notified to the WTO. 31.5 percent of Cuba’s tariffs 
are bound, in the sense of a commitment under WTO 
law not to increase them. This puts Cuba below the 
average for developing countries, which is 73 percent 
(developed countries 99 percent). Cuba’s highest bound 
tariff is 62 percent, the highest actually applied tariff 
30 percent.70 But because state instances regulate im-
ports under a range of different criteria, the economic 
management function of tariffs is very much weaker 
than in the case of market economies. Although the 
WTO principles of non-discrimination and most fa-
voured nation apply in Cuba too, they encounter limits 
in a socialist system where the state directs imports and 
selects (“discriminates”) according to political criteria. 
However, state import management can also make 
the Cuban market especially attractive in particular 
constellations. Cuba is a relatively small economy with 
a limited import volume, but since state-run compa-
nies normally concentrate imports in comparatively 
large orders, it can be very attractive to individual 
foreign suppliers. In fact, German suppliers that have 
succeeded in establishing themselves in the market 
have “secured orders in Cuba that set company records 
on a global scale”.71 So in certain cases firms may ben-
efit from the state system of import regulation. But its 
overall effect is to make Cuba an unpredictable market. 
Bilateral and regional agreements 
concerning trade 
As well as being anchored in the WTO, Cuba’s trade 
relations are embedded in a web of bilateral and 
regional agreements. Unlike in market economies, the 
 
68 GTAI, Tipps für das Kubageschäft (see note 64), 10. 
69 WTO, Cuba and the WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/countries_e/cuba_e.htm (accessed 4 April 2016). 
70 WTO, ITC and UNCTAD, World Tariff Profiles 2014, https:// 
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles14_e.pdf 
(accessed 11 January 2016). 
71 GTAI, Tipps für das Kubageschäft (see note 64), 7. 
function of these agreements is not in the first place 
to set a framework for the activities of individual firms. 
Instead they serve to pursue foreign policy objectives, 
to which economic policy goals are generally sub-
jugated. A special role is occupied by Cuba’s member-
ship in ALBA (the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples 
of Our America), which was founded in January 2004 
by Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro as a platform for ad-
vancing the integration of its member states, inspired 
by the ideas of the freedom fighters Simón Bolívar and 
José Martí. But that should not be understood as mean-
ing economic integration within a free trade area, 
as defined in international trade law. Instead, ALBA 
regards itself as an anti-imperialist, anti-neoliberal 
and anti-capitalist counter-movement to the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas proposed by Washington 
but not yet brought into being. As well as its two 
founding members, the Alliance currently comprises 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Dominica, Ecuador, 
Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, and Saint Kitts and Nevis. According 
to its objectives,72 ALBA deals with trade, but not in 
the sense of full reciprocal market opening. Instead, it 
promotes cooperation between members in particular 
sectors, especially energy and infrastructure.73 ALBA 
offers an umbrella structure for bilateral sectoral co-
operation agreements between member states, such as 
the Cuban-Venezuelan arrangements for oil deliveries 
and medical services. 
Cuba has only notified two agreements to the WTO 
relating to free trade objectives.74 The first is the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA or ALADI), 
which Cuba joined in 1999; its other members are 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Vene-
zuela. LAIA aims to foster trade preferences between 
its members.75 Cuba’s second notified agreement is a 
partial scope agreement with El Salvador. 
In the spirit of international socialist solidarity, 
Havana has always placed great weight on relations 
with developing countries. Cuba’s prestige and inter-
 
72 “[P]olitical, economic, and social alliance in defence of 
independence, self-determination and the identity of peoples 
comprising it”, Alba Info website, http://albainfo.org/what-is-
the-alba/ (accessed 4 April 2016). 
73 Chang, “Cuba’s Insertion in the International Economy 
since 1990” (see note 50), 98. 
74 WTO, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicShowMember RTAID-
Card.aspx?rtaid=881 (accessed 1 April 2016). 
75 ALADI, http://www.aladi.org/sitioAladi/quienesSomos.html 
(accessed 4 April 2016). 
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national influence have been boosted especially by its 
provision of medical services, including rapid aid for 
Haiti after the 2010 earthquake and for West Africa 
during the Ebola crisis of 2014/2015.76 The terms 
of such support are set out in bilateral agreements, 
which Cuba has with Algeria, Angola, China, Qatar 
and South Africa. They cover the export of health 
services, and to a lesser extent also training; in the 
case of Angola and Qatar they also include advisory 
services in the field of sport.77 Medical training for 
foreign students at Cuban universities is also an 
important element of Cuban co-operation with third 
countries. To date Cuba has trained about 50,000 
students from 120 countries; more than 20 percent of 
them came from Latin America and the Caribbean.78 
As well as the great importance of ALBA, the revised 
2016 version of the guidelines underlines the strategic 
objective of expanding economic integration with 
Latin America and the Caribbean (paragraph 86f.). 
Cuba is connected within the Caribbean region 
through a series of institutions. The thirty-two-mem-
ber Association of Caribbean States (ACS) was founded 
in 1994 to strengthen the Caribbean region. Its origi-
nal concept of sectoral cooperation tallied with Cuba’s 
general approach, and led to joint initiatives in areas 
like sustainable tourism, energy, maritime transport 
and higher education. However, the ACS action plan 
for 2016–2018 goes further and proposes establishing 
a working party to study the possibilities for trade 
preferences in the Greater Caribbean.79 This can be 
viewed as a purely long-term project, not only because 
economic change in Cuba is a very slow business. The 
smaller Caribbean states are also likely to be very 
cautious concerning further trade liberalisation in the 
region, because they fear the competition advantages 
of larger ACS members like Mexico and Colombia. This 
reluctance towards integration with larger partners 
was already visible during the implementation of the 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between 
 
76 Francisco López Segrera, Cuba-EEUU: De Enemigos Cercanos 
a Amigos Distantes (1959–2015) [Cuba and the EU: From close 
enemies to distant friends (1959–2015)] (Barcelona, 2015), 58. 
77 Ricardo Torres Pérez, “Structural Problems and Changes 
in Cuba’s Economic Model”, in No More Free Lunch, ed. Brun-
denius and Pérez (see note 2), 5–22 (12). 
78 Luis Suárez Salazar, “Cuba’s Foreign Policy and the 
Promise of ALBA”, NACLA website, n. d., https://nacla.org/ 
article/cubas-foreign-policy-and-promise-alba (accessed 28 
November 2016). 
79 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, Plan of Action for 2016–
2018, http://www.minrex.gob.cu/en/plan-action-2016-2018 
(accessed 7 June 2016). 
the European Union and the CARIFORUM region: the 
smaller Caribbean states in particular hesitate to 
apply the trade liberalisation agreed in the EPA to the 
Dominican Republic.80 In view of the broader member-
ship of the ACS, the prospect of rapid progress on reci-
procal market opening is even less likely. 
Cuba is not a party to the Caribbean EPA, but it 
is a participating state in CARIFORUM, which was 
established with the support of the European Union. 
CARIFORUM originally served as a coordinating body 
for European development funds for the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), then as the coordinator of 
the CARICOM and Dominican Republic side in the EPA 
talks. In the process, it has also become a go-to forum 
for exchange between the Caribbean Community and 
the Dominican Republic. Today CARIFORUM serves the 
implementation of the Caribbean EPA.81 Cuba’s ties 
with CARICOM itself are even closer, and are rooted in 
long-standing political links between the countries 
involved. The members of CARICOM were among the 
first states to recognise Cuba after the revolution, and 
opened formal relations despite strong pressure from 
the United States not to do so. For CARICOM Cuba is a 
major contributor of training programmes in fields 
such as medicine and health, sport, agriculture, trade 
and tourism.82 Cuba educates many of the region’s 
doctors; between 2014 and 2016 alone, eight hundred 
Guyanese students came to study medicine.83 
Negotiations on updating the Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement between Cuba and CARICOM 
were concluded in March 2017. The agreement aims to 
promote and facilitate trade in goods and services and 
to encourage and protect investments. At the same time, 
it creates a basis for wider joint activities in many sec-
tors, as well as creating an institutional framework for 
 
80 Evita Schmieg, Trade and Investment Agreements for Sustain-
able Development? Lessons from the EU’s Economic Partnership Agree-
ment with the Caribbean, SWP Research Paper 2015/06 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2015). 
81 Caribbean Community Secretariat, What Is CARIFORUM? 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community_organs/cariforum/ 
cariforum_main_page.jsp?menu=cob (accessed 17 March 2016). 
82 “Cuba is now considered, by far, the largest contributor 
among Caricom’s international partners.” From “Cuba a Criti-
cal Partner to CARICOM, Says Brantley”, interview with Mark 
Brantley, Regional News, 14 December 2015, http://caricom.org/ 
media-center/communications/news-from-the-community/ 
cuba-a-critical-partner-to-caricom-says-brantley (accessed 8 June 
2016). 
83 Interview with Percival Marie, director general of 
CARIFORUM, 5 December 2015. 
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ongoing dialogue.84 The agreement’s update now for-
sees improved market access for a range of products, 
including pharmaceuticals exported from Cuba and 
beer, fish, and agricultural products from CARICOM.85 
The governments of the Caribbean states regard Cuba 
as the partner they need to complete the ongoing 
political and economic integration of the region – as 
laid out in CARICOM’s founding treaties. 
The Caribbean states naturally hope to benefit from 
closer integration with Cuba, with which they are 
already politically connected. But they also worry over 
Cuba’s growing economic weight; the smaller island 
states in particular fear further marginalisation 
through growing competition from their larger neigh-
bour.86 The Caribbean governments expect Cuba’s 
economy to strengthen and its regional competition 
to sharpen in certain areas. This applies not only to 
trade in goods such as rum, sugar and other agricul-
tural products, but also to tourism. They therefore also 
see Cuba’s increasing opening to foreign trade as a spur 
to improve their own competitiveness.87 Analysis of 
the Cuban reforms and their impact, on the other hand, 
suggests that major economic change will come about 
slowly, if at all, and the other countries in the region 
will therefore have time for adjustment processes. 
Cuban economists tend to criticise regional integra-
tion agreements based on trade liberalisation as neo-
liberal instruments. But at the same time they see 
deepening of the joint Caribbean market as an oppor-
tunity to become more independent of the North 
American market.88 In general free trade agreements 
 
84 “Trade and Economic Co-Operation Agreement between 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Government 
of the Republic of Cuba”, available at UNCTAD, http:// 
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2498 
(accessed 6 June 2016). 
85 CARICOM, “Cuba Agrees to Extension on Trade Agreement 
with CARICOM”, CARICOM website, 14 March 2017, http:// 
caricom.org/media-center/communications/news-from-the-
community/cuba-agrees-to-extension-on-trade-agreement-
with-caricom (accessed 30 March 2017). 
86 “Will Cuba Change Caricom?” editorial, Jamaica Observer, 
5 July 2015, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/Will-
Cuba-change-Caricom- (accessed 17 March 2016). 
87 CARICOM, “Caribbean Tourism Stakeholders Say Cuba 
Is the Regions’s Wakeup Call”, 13 August 2015, http:// 
caricom.org/media-center/communications/news-from-the-
community/caribbean-tourism-stakeholders-say-cuba-is-
regions-wakeup-call (accessed 30 November 2016). 
88 Laneydi Martínez Alfonso, “Retos Actuales de la Integra-
cíon en América Latina y el Caribe” [Current challenges of 
Latin American and Caribbean integration], Temas de Economía 
are today regarded as an important means for 
securing preferential access to other markets as 
a means of expanding Cuba’s own exports.89 
Current situation in trade in goods 
One major goal of the guidelines for updating Cuba’s 
economic model is to increase and stabilise export 
revenues (paragraphs 76 and 77). Great emphasis is 
placed on diversifying exports, substituting imports 
and generally improving the external economic situa-
tion. High-value exports are regarded as especially 
desirable.90 In this connection the guidelines also 
propose developing a strategy for expanding service 
exports, with particular attention to technological 
aspects (paragraph 80). This is concretised in the 
revised 2016 version of the guidelines in terms of con-
centration on export of professional services (para-
graph 69). In this way it is hoped to expand opportu-
nities for existing skilled workers. Suitable sectors in 
which Cuba’s achievements are internationally recog-
nised include biotech, medical and pharmaceutical 
products, software, nanotechnology, and scientific 
and technological services.91 Exports of health services 
are also to be stepped up (paragraph 70). 
In fact, Cuba’s export revenues in 2015 – $4.4 bil-
lion – were lower than in 2010; in comparison to the 
two previous years they fell by about 15 percent.92 
Manufactured goods contribute 38 percent of exports, 
with pharmaceuticals playing a prominent role. Food 
accounts for 30 percent, most of which is accounted 
for by just three products: sugar, tobacco and rum. 
Fuel represents 11 percent, part of which is re-exported 
Venezuelan oil. In terms of minerals, nickel ore alone 
 
Mundial (Havana: Centro de Investigaciones de la Economía 
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89 Ricardo Torres Pérez, “Los Cambios Económicos en Cuba y 
su Posible Influencia en el Comercio con América Latina y el 
Caribe” [The economic transformation in Cuba and its pos-
sible effects on trade with Latin America and the Caribbean], 
in Cuba y América Latina: Impacto de las Reformas en el Comercio 
de Bienes y Servicios [Cuba and Latin America: Impact of the re-
forms on trade in goods and services], ed. Miriam Fernández 
and Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva (Barcelona and Buenos 
Aires, 2013), 11–34. 
90 VI Congreso del PCC, Lineamientos (see note 9), 8, 17. 
91 Pérez, “Structural Problems and Changes in Cuba’s Eco-
nomic Model” (see note 77), 18. 
92 Unless otherwise indicated, all data from UNCTADSTAT, 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/ 
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represents about 13 percent of exports. While Cuba’s 
foreign trade is no longer completely dependent on 
raw materials, diversification into non-traditional 
products has been slow to date; successes include 
medical, pharmaceutical and biotechnological prod-
ucts, machinery, and transport equipment. 
The composition of the countries receiving Cuban 
exports has undergone a series of transformations 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2000 the EU 
was the main destination with 35 percent of exports, 
followed by Russia (18 percent) and Canada (17 per-
cent). In 2014 Venezuela topped the list with 32 per-
cent, but its share fell in 2015 to 25 percent, closely 
followed by the EU (21 percent), Canada (16 percent) 
and China, whose 15 percent puts it almost on a par 
with Canada. Although Russia is now almost irrele-
vant (with 1.4 percent), it has in the meantime for-
given 90 percent of Cuba’s debts, with an option to 
convert the remaining 10 percent into Russian stakes 
in Cuban enterprises.93 This will not only put trade on 
a new footing but also enable broader ties between 
the two economies. Other countries have also grown 
considerably in importance as recipients of Cuban 
exports, with Belize, Ghana, Dominican Republic and 
Brazil all exceeding 8 percent in 2015. Canada, as the 
second-largest trade partner, is at the same time the 
largest source of tourists, the second-largest supplier 
of public development aid and a significant originator 
of foreign direct investment, above all through Sher-
ritt International’s nickel-mining joint venture.94 
Cuban imports in 2015 reflect an elevated depend-
ency on Venezuela (34 percent compared to 22 percent 
in 2000), followed by the EU with 28 percent and 
China with 12 percent. China’s role as a cooperation 
partner has grown considerably across the board. It 
supplies industrial products such as buses, televisions 
and refrigerators on low-interest loans, and has there-
fore become an important lender. China is also inter-
ested in Cuba’s mineral reserves, principally import-
ing nickel and cobalt. In return, Cuba shares its bio-
tech and pharmaceutical production know-how with 
China,95 and is a dialogue partner on the topic of 
developing a socialist market economy.96 
Against this backdrop, the diversification of trade 
partners proposed in the guidelines (paragraph 78) 
remains important. In particular, Cuba would like to 
 
93 Segrera, Cuba-EEUU (see note 76), 56. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Elmar Kulke, “Die Entwicklung der Wirtschaft in Kuba”, 
in ibid., Kuba – Auf Tour (Heidelberg, 2011), 47. 
96 Segrera, Cuba-EEUU (see note 76), 56. 
reduce its reliance on re-exporting Venezuelan oil for 
hard currency revenues. But export successes will re-
quire fundamental obstacles to be addressed through 
reforms. A series of deficits will need to be tackled 
before Cuban production and productivity can be 
expanded:97 poor physical infrastructure, complicated 
customs and transport systems, high costs and/or lack 
of production-relevant inputs, and a complex regu-
latory environment. The Cuban economist Ricardo 
Torres Pérez also emphasises the importance of access 
to credit to fund the necessary infrastructure invest-
ments. This problem is exacerbated by Cuba’s exclu-
sion from World Bank loans, which would be available 
to other countries in comparable situations.98 
For all these reasons it must be assumed that Cuba 
will be unable to compete in the global market on the 
basis of advantages of scale or cost. Instead it must 
seek its edge in very specific sectors reliant on educa-
tion and research, such as pharmaceutical and biotech 
products.99 In order to develop its biotechnology sec-
tor, Cuba is collaborating above all with other devel-
oping countries, especially Venezuela; at the same 
time it also operates as an investor, for example in 
China.100 But Antonio Gómez of the University of 
Havana criticises that the medical/pharmaceutical and 
biotech sectors are the only high-technology fields 
with demonstrable scientific and economic worth.101 
In view of the circumstances and obstacles, it is likely 
to remain very difficult for Cuba’s export sector to 
achieve the goals it has been set: diversifying export 
structure and destination and expanding exports and 
their value content. 
The Cuban economy is highly import-dependent. A 
large proportion of its food and fuel needs have to be 
imported, while its ability to balance its trade through 
exports of goods has deteriorated steadily since about 
2000. In this situation, the trade deficit was one of the 
significant factors spurring the development of a new 
economic model; the merchandise trade balance has 
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Cuban companies], Cuba y América Latina, ed. Fernández and 
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improved since 2009, although it still remains nega-
tive.102 
The negative merchandise trade balance is made 
up by remittances and service exports. Most of the $5.1 
billion annual remittances originate from the United 
States. The total is likely to rise rapidly, now that 
Washington has raised the limit from $500 to $2,000 
per quarter and person or institution (and abolished 
it entirely for payments to humanitarian projects and 
private businesses).103 Remittances exert great influ-
ence on the dynamics of the Cuban economy, because 
they represent a source of funding for many of the 
self-employed. 
The importance of services in Cuban exports has 
expanded rapidly over the past fifteen years, to a point 
where they now outstrip exports of goods. Services 
have grown from 10 percent of total exports in 1990 to 
70 percent since 2005.104 Within the WTO framework, 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
defines four modes of service provision: cross border 
trade (for example in insurance services), consump-
tion abroad (for example tourism), commercial pres-
ence through investment (such as opening a hairdress-
ing salon), and provision by a natural person working 
abroad (for example a doctor). By far the most impor-
tant service exports for Cuba are tourism (mode 2) 
and temporary migration of medical workers (mode 4). 
These are discussed in greater detail below. 
The growing importance of tourism 
Tourism already acquired an important function in 
the so-called Special Period following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, when trade with the socialist bloc 
evaporated and it was urgently necessary to generate 
hard currency for vital imports. The number of annual 
visits passed the one million mark in 1997, and by 
2004 there were more than two million, making Cuba 
the third-placed tourism destination in the Carib-
 
102 Ibid., 134. 
103 Jennifer M. Harris, “The Winners of Cuba’s ‘New’ Economy” 
(commentary), Fortune, 14 January 2015, http://fortune.com/ 
2015/01/14/the-winners-of-cubas-new-economy/ (accessed 
31 March 2016). 
104 Oscar U-Echevarría Vallejo, “The Evolution of Cuba’s 
Macroeconomy: From the Triumph of the Revolution through 
the Special Period”, in Cuban Economists on the Cuban Economy, 
ed. Campbell (see note 19), 62–88 (73). 
bean.105 In 2016, according to the Cuban Tourism 
Ministry, more than 3.7 million people visited the 
country, with 4.1 million expected in 2017. Interest-
ingly, the proportion entering on cruises is much 
smaller than in other Caribbean countries (just 1 per-
cent). This type of tourism is generally associated with 
very low domestic value added. 
The number of visitors from the United States has 
grown especially strongly, with 77 percent growth in 
2015 alone. But great potential for growth still remains. 
In February 2016 the United States and Cuba agreed 
to resume regular direct flights between the two coun-
tries, which is likely to further increase the numbers 
of US visitors.106 Although US citizens must in theory 
belong to one of twelve categories in order to obtain 
permission to visit Cuba, they no longer need to apply 
for a licence, making the travel restrictions irrelevant 
in practice. In 2015 Cuba earned more than $2.8 bil-
lion from tourism.107 The most important countries 
of origin are currently Canada with 41.6 percent, Italy 
with 5.6 percent, Germany with 5.1 percent and France 
with 4.6 percent; Italy, Spain and Poland exhibit the 
strongest growth rates (January 2015 year-on-year).108 
With tourism Cuba has tapped a significant source 
of hard currency, which has in fact exceeded the value 
of goods exports since 1998.109 But it is also viewed as 
a threat to socialist achievements by contributing to 
class differentiation and inequality, because those 
who work in the tourism industry receive direct access 
to hard currency.110 Further negative effects are ex-
pected, such as an increase in drug consumption and 
prostitution which are judged as incompatible with 
socialist values. Moreover, surveys show that the Cuban 
population fears that foreign visitors could squeeze 
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(accessed 4 April 2016). 
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out domestic tourism. The government is actively 
addressing this worry at least, by expanding provision 
for Cuban holidaymakers. The guidelines also include 
corresponding targets. So the expansion of tourism is 
highly welcome, but also watched with scepticism. 
Another development in this area is also a double-
edged sword: the growing numbers of highly qualified 
workers moving to the rapidly growing tourism sec-
tor, with fifteen thousand university graduates report-
edly having left their original professions to do so.111 
While Cuban economists see this as one cause of the 
strong productivity growth in this branch, it also 
means that existing qualifications are not being used 
truly efficiently. 
Cuba has, however, succeeded – partly through 
a deliberate policy – in leveraging tourism for local 
value and job creation,112 which are preconditions 
for this sector to contribute to economic growth and 
social development. The connection arises above all 
through the supply of goods for tourism purposes; 
principally food, but also craft products. But the fun-
damental limitations of the Cuban economy make it 
difficult to expand agricultural deliveries to hotels. 
The decision to permit farmers to sell their products 
directly to hotels at an exchange rate of CUP10/$1 has 
not had the expected effect of significantly increasing 
direct deliveries from Cuban agricultural producers. 
While the local share of products supplied to the 
tourism sector has grown from 12 percent in the early 
2000s to about 68 percent today,113 non-agricultural 
products must largely account for the increase. Tour-
ism can also create demand for services such as music, 
sport and gastronomy. Two thousand music groups 
with a total of eleven thousand members are associat-
ed with the Cuban tourism sector.114 The guidelines 
therefore place great importance on strengthening 
relations between tourism and the local economy.115 
But like other sectors, tourism will only be able to 
achieve its full potential – above all for contributing 
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(184). 
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to increased value added – once restrictions in related 
areas, especially agriculture, have been overcome. 
Foreign deployment of medical personnel 
Foreign deployment of Cuban medical personnel is 
not only a pillar of political cooperation, but has also 
become an important source of hard currency. In eco-
nomic terms this represents a service export in GATS 
mode 4. However, the Cuban medical personnel sent 
within the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) – above all to 
Venezuela – are officially declared not as a service 
export but as cooperation to mutual advantage out-
side the logic of capitalist trade.116 The precise number 
of Cuban medical staff working abroad is unknown, 
but is estimated at 30,000 to 50,000.117 The total an-
nual revenue is reportedly about €4.6 billion, making 
it the country’s most important source of hard cur-
rency ahead even of tourism.118 
However, exporting medical services has transpired 
not to be entirely unproblematic for Cuba. A (small) 
proportion of those involved defect and fail to return – 
even though the arrangements are designed to pre-
vent precisely that. While on deployment, personnel 
receive only a small proportion of the “fee” paid by the 
host country. Most of it is deposited in a hard currency 
account in Cuba that they can only access after their 
return – and not until they have completed the entire 
agreed period of service. According to Solidaridad sin 
Fronteras, a Miami-based doctors’ organisation, the 
Cuban government keeps up to 93 percent of the cur-
rency revenues received for medical work.119 
Migration to the United States has been facilitated 
by an American initiative of 2006, the Cuban Medical 
Professional Parole Program under which Cuban doc-
tors receive a residence permit for the United States.120 
In 2014 1,278 Cuban doctors emigrated to the United 
States under this programme.121 In 2015 unauthorised 
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emigration of Cuban doctors to the United States 
almost doubled, to about 43,000.122 In December 2015, 
in response to this brain drain, Havana reversed its 
decision of 2013 to abolish the exit visa requirement 
for doctors, because emigration was causing serious 
difficulties for the domestic health system. 
While temporary migration of medical staff plays 
an important role in generating hard currency, it does 
nothing to promote value creation or social develop-
ment within the country. Because the involved experts 
provide their services abroad, they are largely un-
connected to other sectors at home. So apart from the 
currency revenues themselves, stimuli for dynamic 
development cannot be expected from this quarter. 
Cuba has considerably expanded its hard currency 
revenues through tourism and medical services, and 
to that extent succeeded in fulfilling its economic 
plan. In view of the inadequacy of the data, it is hard 
to assess the extent to which this has contributed to 
the country’s development. The Cuban economist 
Pedro Monreal González questions whether what he 
calls the country’s “dual model” is any better than 
having fundamentally closer ties to the world econo-
my.123 The expansion of exports – including services – 
sought under the guidelines requires the development 
of further export-capable service sectors; areas offering 
high productivity and potential to improve economic 
efficiency, such as production-related services, are 
thus particularly sought-after. However, the develop-
ment of such services requires different infrastructure 
than production and trade in goods, for example tele-
communications, information technology, and air 
travel. These are areas where Cuba lags well behind 
international standards.124 Incoherent political deci-
sions relating to significant factors therefore also 
hamper the expansion of production and export of 
services. 
Altogether the Cuban trade sector is far from 
achieving its goals of increasing exports and diversi-
fying trading partners to contribute to sustainable 
development and diminish dependency on Vene-
zuelan oil. Cuba has enjoyed only limited success in 
linking its exports with growing domestic value 
creation and employment as a contribution to sustain-
able development. An important role is therefore 
attributed to foreign direct investment, not only 
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Development, ed. Domínguez et al. (see note 21), 227–36 (231). 
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for the influx of capital and technology but also for 
diversification of exports.125 
Foreign direct investment 
Cuba’s sixty bilateral investment agreements encom-
pass most European countries, including Spain (1994), 
Germany (1996) and France (1997); twenty agreements 
have been signed but are not yet in force.126 These 
agreements regulate fundamental questions such as 
non-discrimination (vis-à-vis domestic companies), 
compensation in event of expropriation, free transfer 
of capital and dispute settlement. As such, they create 
a legal framework for investment, but without the in-
strument of investor-state dispute settlement, which is 
included in most other bilateral investment agree-
ments but has come to be seen as highly controversial. 
In a socialist economy it is also hard to imagine for-
eign investors being granted the right to take the gov-
ernment to court. Accordingly, Cuba’s agreement with 
Germany – unlike many other German investment 
protection agreements – provides only for a tribunal 
to convene on a case-by-case basis.127 
Investments in services also fall under the WTO’s 
services agreement (GATS), under which Cuba grants 
its WTO partners access to its own markets. Foreign 
stakes in joint ventures are limited to a maximum of 
49 percent, but the authorities may permit a larger 
share in specific cases.128 
The question of foreign direct investment is a prior-
ity in the guidelines of 2011 and the 2016 revision. 
The documents tie acquisition of foreign direct invest-
ment to concrete objectives such as access to modern 
technologies, export diversification, import substitu-
tion, job creation and securing the provision of food 
and basic goods to the Cuban population, as well as 
access to foreign markets through joint ventures. Par-
ticular emphasis is placed on diversifying the coun-
tries of origin.129 The revised 2016 version of the guide-
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lines underlines foreign direct investment as an im-
portant development stimulus. 
A new investment law (Ley de Inversión Extranjera) 
came into force in June 2014, substantially altering 
access for foreign direct investment in certain fields. 
While the new law permits foreign companies to in-
vest in all sectors apart from health, education and 
the military, in practice the principal exclusions are 
the sugar and biotechnology industries. The invest-
ment law grants foreign investors certain guarantees 
(no expropriation without compensation) and numer-
ous tax breaks.130 
In a break with prior tradition, purely foreign com-
panies may now operate independently (rather than 
being limited to stakes in joint ventures). But such 
investments must be approved by Cuba’s highest ad-
ministrative organ, the Council of Ministers. More-
over, purely foreign companies cannot enjoy the tax 
breaks, not even in the Special Development Zone 
Mariel.131 In autumn 2014 the government put out to 
tender 246 projects with a total volume of $8.7 billion 
for foreign investment.132 They span practically all 
sectors, including twenty-one new hotels, renewable 
energy (including wind farm projects with 100 per-
cent foreign ownership) and consumer products such 
as shoes and glassware. But to date there is no purely 
foreign company operating in Cuba.133 
The activities of the online accommodation service 
Airbnb suggest that hard currency is one of Cuba’s 
central motivations for permitting foreign direct 
investment. Since 2015 Airbnb has been using the 
accommodation system run by Casas Particulares, the 
state agency supplying private rooms to tourists.134 
Given the rapid growth in both visitor numbers and 
rooms offered this is likely to be a highly profitable 
business. It is not immediately obvious in this case why 
the Cuban state has relinquished its monopoly to a 
foreign private company – in an area based largely on 
human capital that Cuba was previously plainly able 
to run on its own. One possible explanation is Havana’s 
great interest in acquiring access to hard currency. 
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Foreign direct investment already plays a role in 
important sectors today. Thus there are about 250 
joint ventures; the most important countries of origin 
are Spain, Italy, Canada and Venezuela, the principal 
sectors tourism (where for example the Spanish hotel 
chain Sol Meliá is active), oil and energy.135 But foreign 
firms are also active in other economically and politi-
cally important areas. Canadian Sherritt International, 
for example, holds a 50-percent stake in a nickel-
mining joint venture. Imperial Tobacco is involved in 
distribution of Cohiba cigars, also with a 50 percent 
stake, while the French firm Pernod Ricard is involved 
with Havana Club rum. Nestlé, the world’s largest food 
producer, holds 60 percent of Cuban ice cream manu-
facturer Coralac and 50 percent of mineral water 
supplier Los Portales. Unilever has a 50-percent joint 
venture with Cuban cosmetics manufacturer 
Suchel.136 
As a study by political economist Richard Feinberg 
shows, foreign investors value Cuba for secure market 
share, its stable economic environment and the politi-
cal “inclusion” of the trade unions. Notably, they are 
positive towards the lack of typical competitive 
aspects that make business strenuous in the market 
environment. Operating in socialism may be easier, 
but the flip side is seen where investors name the 
drawbacks: the state-directed recruitment and pay 
system, price controls constraining profitability, 
dependency on unreliable suppliers, and workforce 
loyalty issues.137 The reason for the latter results is 
that workers have no direct contractual relationship 
with their employer, only with the Cuban state. 
The guidelines for updating the economic model 
also formed the basis for creating the Special Develop-
ment Zone Mariel, through Law No. 313 of September 
2013. Brazil supported the project through its develop-
ment bank BNDES, with a loan covering almost two-
thirds of the total costs of $900 million; and the Brazil-
ian company Odebrecht did the construction work.138 
The heart of the Special Development Zone is a deep-
water port forty-five kilometres from Havana, whose 
first phase was inaugurated at the beginning of 2014. 
Through Mariel, Cuba hopes to establish itself as a 
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Caribbean transport node, leveraging its closeness 
to the Panama Canal and the United States. Firms 
operating in the Special Development Zone enjoy tax 
incentives and special arrangements for employment. 
Although, as usual in Cuba, workers must be employed 
through state employment agencies, these take less 
than the normal 90 percent as their fee.139 
Generally, conditions for private foreign invest-
ment in Cuba have improved over recent years. As far 
as relations with the United States are concerned, it 
will not be enough to resolve the fundamental issue of 
the embargo; there is also great potential for business-
to-business conflict. The dispute over the rum brand 
Havana Club represents a good example of the kind 
of problem that will need to be resolved if relations 
between the United States and Cuba are to improve 
further. “Havana Club” was registered as a Cuban 
brand in the United States in January 2016,140 to the 
great displeasure of the formerly Cuban, now Ameri-
can firm Bacardi, which had hitherto been the sole 
supplier of Havana Club rum in the United States (al-
beit also labelled “Puerto Rican Rum”). Today “Havana 
Club” is produced in Cuba by the Franco-Cuban joint 
venture Cuba Ron/Pernod Ricard. Although Cuba and 
Pernod Ricard registered the trademark in the United 
States in 1976 and 1995 respectively, in 1997 Bacardi 
declared itself the rightful owner in the United States, 
citing its relationship with the inventor of Havana 
Club, José Arechabala. Under American trademark 
law, actual use of a brand plays a crucial role; the user 
becomes the legitimate owner. In 2012 the US Su-
preme Court ruled that the Cuban export firm Cuba-
export had no right to register the brand with the US 
Patent and Trademark Office. But various US minis-
tries subsequently engineered a new decision that 
fitted with the current policy of détente with Cuba. 
Bacardi for its part intends to defend its position. 
Havana Club is just one example of the kind of 
private sector conflict that will have to be resolved 
in the wake of the Cuban-American rapprochement. 
Many companies that were nationalised during and 
after the revolution – especially those based in the 
United States – are simply waiting for the opportunity 
 
139 Ibid. 
140 On the following, see “Wem gehört Havana Club? Es 
geht um Geld, Macht – und die große Weltpolitik”, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 February 2016. Details to be found in 
Stephen J. Kimmerling, Havana Club: A Case Summary and an 
Analysis of Selected Legal Issues, Association for the Study of 
the Cuban Economy, http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/09/v09-kimmerlg.pdf (accessed 30 March 2017). 
to sue for compensation; they include Coca-Cola, 
Exxon Mobil and Colgate-Palmolive. In the 1970s the 
US Department of Justice put the total compensation 
claim for six thousand cases at more than $1.8 billion 
(at today’s value about $7 billion).141 Cuba rejects these 
claims, and is instead seeking damages of $834 billion 
incurred through the US embargo and CIA attacks.142 
It is unlikely that Cuba will ever be willing or able 
to pay the compensation demanded. One possibility 
already discussed in the media would be to grant 
Cuban state licences, for example for mining, tourism 
or transport, to companies owed compensation. This 
would be similar to the option used to settle the re-
maining 10 percent of Cuba’s debts to Russia. 
Cuba’s improving political and economic relations 
with the United States have fostered growing interest 
in investment there. And Washington’s removal of 
Cuba from its list of countries supporting terrorism is 
also likely to facilitate trade financing. However, Ger-
many Trade and Invest (GTAI) advises German firms 
against investing in Cuba, even with a majority stake, 
because of the lack of legal security.143 Foreign part-
ners have in the past often been forced out of joint 
ventures when Cuba’s interests changed, despite for-
mal guarantees. The risks are smaller in technologically 
advanced sectors, where Cuba is reliant on foreign 
know-how. 
Numerous administrative obstacles contribute to 
the suboptimal conditions. These include employment 
rules, as well as protracted approval procedures and 
a generally low level of entrepreneurial freedom. Cen-
tralised state control of import and export licences 
opens the door for clientelism and creates risks for 
business. These factors explain why the number of 
foreign investments has receded since about 2005,144 
and why to date neither the investment law of 2014 
nor the creation of Special Development Zone Mariel 
has increased the number of projects.145 
If the Cuban government wishes to achieve a situa-
tion where foreign direct investment contributes to 
more dynamic development (of exports) it will also 
have to persuade SMEs to participate. As well as large-
 
141 Busch, “Kubas Öffnung” (see note 134). 
142 “Lots of Diplomacy, Not Many Dollars: The Fruits of a 
Historic Year for the United States and Cuba”, Economist, 
12 December 2015. 
143 GTAI, Tipps für das Kubageschäft (see note 64), 13, with 
further details on the possible legal entities for foreign 
engagement. 
144 Romero G., “Los Desafíos” (see note 51), 145. 
145 EIU, Cuba: Country Report, 11 June 2015. 
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scale projects, the list of tendered investment projects 
accordingly also includes ones within the scope of 
SMEs. There also needs to be a change in the frame-
work to stimulate internal investment and a general 
strengthening of the economy through private-sector 
activity. In order to enhance economic growth, the 
Cuban economist Antonio Gómez recommends a clear 
distinction between entrepreneurial and state func-
tions; transparent principles should represent the 
only restrictions that govern company decisions.146 
That shows that the internal debate within Cuba has 
also identified the fundamental problems of the coun-
try’s economy. 
The difficult circumstances for private-sector activi-
ties hinder the inflow of foreign direct investment. In 
connection with the investment law of 2014 the gov-
ernment hoped to attract $2.5 billion annually. That 
is the amount needed to achieve the desired economic 
growth of more than 5 percent.147 Foreign direct in-
vestment is essential to achieve the development goals 
set out in the guidelines, to maintain and modernise 
existing industrial facilities, and to facilitate an expan-
sion of exports and a diversification of production. 
Here the European Union is a very significant partner, 
not only on account of its economic weight but also 
as a technological leader in important sectors.148 
 
 
 
146 Gómez, Transformaciones Económicas (see note 23), 22. 
147 Juan Triana Cordoví, “Las Reglas del Juego” [The rules 
of the game], On Cuba (online), 24 October 2016, http:// 
oncubamagazine.com/columnas/las-reglas-del-juego/ 
(accessed 25 November 2016). 
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Relations with the European Union 
 
The Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement 
of 2016 
As a relatively significant trade and investment part-
ner, Europe has the potential to play an important 
role in the process of reforming the Cuban economy. 
The EU is Cuba’s second-largest trading partner after 
Venezuela, which is currently fading rapidly. In 2016 
Cuba exported goods worth €417 million to the EU.149 
Companies from EU member states are already major 
investors in Cuba, above all in the areas of tourism, 
construction, light industry and agriculture. About 
one-third of the island’s tourists come from the EU. 
And Europe is also an important source of develop-
ment funding. Between 2008 and 2014 the EU sup-
plied about €90 million for development cooperation 
with Cuba, the priorities being agriculture and food 
security, environmental and climate protection, and 
supporting a sustainable economic and social mod-
ernisation.150 On the other hand, Cuba is not of great 
economic significance for Europe. Its share of the 
EU’s total external trade is just 0.1 percent, with ex-
ports of more than €2.0 billion in 2016, above all 
machinery and transport equipment, chemicals and 
manufactured goods. 
The Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement 
initialled on 11 March 2016 after two years of nego-
tiations creates a new framework for political and 
economic relations.151 It succeeds the EU’s Common 
Position of 1996,152 which made full cooperation with 
Cuba conditional on progress on human rights and 
political liberties but did not exclude instruments of 
economic cooperation. The EU reduced mutual rela-
 
149 European Commission, European Union, Trade in 
Goods with Cuba, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/ 
september/tradoc_122460.pdf (accessed 30 March 2017). 
150 European Commission, International Cooperation and Devel-
opment, Cuba, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/cuba_ 
en (accessed 30 March 2017). 
151 European Commission, “European Commission Proposes 
Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba”, 
press release, 22 September 2016. 
152 EU, Common Position of 2 December 1996 Defined by the Council 
on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Cuba 
(96/697/CFSP), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
PDF/?uri=CELEX:31996E0697 (accessed 15 July 2016). 
tions to a minimum in 2003, after seventy-five dissi-
dents were detained. Not until 2008, after the release 
of political prisoners, was the relationship upgraded 
again. 
Despite their Common Position, the EU member 
states developed widely differing stances towards 
Cuba. In view of the nineteen bilateral political decla-
rations and memoranda of understanding between 
Cuba and individual EU states,153 the Common Posi-
tion ultimately lost its significance. According to the 
Latin America expert Günther Maihold, “in certain EU 
member states, Cuba policy was easily instrumental-
ised for domestic and ideological purposes”; finding 
a common position was also made more difficult by 
the historically rooted anti-communism in the eastern 
member states, which refused to cooperate with a 
totalitarian regime.154 Against this backdrop the Dia-
logue and Cooperation Agreement of 2016 offers the 
EU an opportunity to reinstate a joint stance towards 
Havana. Cuba values the agreement for strengthening 
its international recognition, contributing to a diver-
sification of cooperation partners, and establishing a 
firm framework for future economic and political 
relations. 
The agreement contains three main areas: (1) politi-
cal dialogue; (2) cooperation and sectoral dialogue; 
(3) trade and trade cooperation. On trade it goes no 
further than underlining the WTO principles of most-
favoured treatment and non-discrimination and refer-
encing WTO rules such as those on sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, and 
trade facilitation. The agreement contains little in the 
way of substance, and is not a free trade and invest-
ment agreement of the kind the EU has concluded 
with other partners. The two sides do not grant each 
other improved access to markets or for investments, 
and the EU enters into no new commitments. Its value 
is therefore above all political; it creates the basis for 
a regular dialogue and defines areas of cooperation. 
 
153 EEAS, Joint Declaration at the Initialling Ceremony of the 
Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between Cuba and the 
European Union (Havana, 10 March 2016), http://eeas.europa. 
eu/statements-eeas/2016/160311_01_en.htm (accessed 13 
March 2016). 
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In fact, “one of the most important motivations 
of European engagement is to get the Union’s voice 
heard in Cuba and to accompany the expected govern-
ance discussions there”.155 Article 5 therefore provides 
for the establishment of a human rights dialogue, but 
the concrete topics are as yet undefined and this is a 
field where great differences exist between the parties. 
The agreement now creates the basis for a dialogue 
on issues such as freedom of speech and of the press, 
which would represent the beginnings of a normalisa-
tion of EU-Cuban relations. Previously, Cuba had been 
the only Latin American country without a trade or 
cooperation agreement with the EU. 
The EU’s trade policy provides no preferences for 
Cuba; the EU tariffs notified to the WTO apply. For a 
long time Cuba benefited from the EU’s Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries. 
But Cuba was removed from the GSP list after the 
World Bank classified it as “upper middle income” 
for three successive years on the basis of its high GDP. 
This impacted negatively on Cuban tobacco exports, 
where the tariff rose significantly.156 The country’s 
classification as upper middle income, as discussed 
above, is based on the official exchange rate of 
CUC1/$1. If the currency is devalued, as proposed in 
the guidelines, Cuba could once again benefit from 
European trade preferences under the EU’s General-
ised System of Preferences. 
Fundamentally it would also be conceivable for 
Cuba to join the Economic Partnership Agreement 
between the EU and the CARIFORUM countries, which 
came into effect in 2008. At the same time this would 
also promote trade integration within the Caribbean 
region. But Cuba’s socialist economic model and politi-
cal principles mitigate against joining an agreement 
aiming to liberalise flows of goods and services on the 
basis of private contracts. Trade cooperation of that 
kind with Cuba is therefore unlikely to come into 
being in the near future. 
Germany’s interests and engagement 
Germany’s position towards Cuba has moved with-
in the scope of the agreed basic European position. 
Although Germany completed negotiations on a 
bilateral cultural agreement with Cuba in 2003, it 
 
155 Translated from ibid., 7. 
156 Ibid. 
never came into effect because of the human rights 
situation. 
On 16 July 2015, Cuba and Germany signed a joint 
declaration regulating the bilateral relationship and 
to that extent supplementing the EU-Cuba agreement.157 
It is initially valid for two years, but is extended auto-
matically if not terminated by either side. Cuba values 
this agreement as a political signal for a normalisation 
of relations. It hopes for growing interest of German 
investors in the fields of agriculture, high-tech, renew-
able energy, and infrastructure; growth in tourism is 
also desired.158 The declaration provides for coopera-
tion in the fields of business, research, technology, 
education, culture and sport, as well as joint bilateral 
projects in third states. A political consultation 
mechanism is provided, including regular annual con-
sultations at the level of director general. In fact, the 
exchange planned with Cuba is unusually close. The 
first bilateral consultations with any Latin American 
country were only held in 2015, namely, with Brazil 
(and here at ministerial level) which is considerably 
more important for Germany under aspects such as 
trade, investment and resources. Such strong engage-
ment for little Cuba comes as something of a surprise. 
German industry also appears to demonstrate 
strong interest in Cuba, even if the small market and 
difficult circumstances hardly justify this. In January 
2016 German Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel 
visited Cuba with a sixty-strong business delegation. 
He said he saw opportunities for German industry in 
medical technology, biotechnology, and energy, waste 
disposal and water.159 Historically, German firms have 
already been involved in fields such as electricity and 
water supply, as well as restoration projects in Old 
Havana and the seafront promenade. The large num-
ber of business representatives accompanying the 
minister is an indication of the “gold rush” mood 
created by the reforms. It is planned to open a German 
business representation in Havana to promote trade 
and investment.160 
 
157 Auswärtiges Amt, “Außenminister Steinmeier besucht 
erstmals Kuba”, 18 July 2015, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/ 
DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Aktuelle_Artikel/Kuba/150707_BM_
besucht_Kuba.html (accessed 19 September 2016). 
158 “‘Kuba will keine Schocktherapie’. Bruno Rodríguez im 
Interview”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 May 2016. 
159 Dana Heide, “Einsatz in Havanna: Wirtschaftsminister 
Gabriel ist in Kuba unterwegs”, Handelsblatt, 8 January 2016. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The rapprochement between Cuba and the United 
States has reset the coordinates for the island state’s 
external economic development by making it possible 
for Havana to normalise its relations with other states 
too; this includes closer trade relations and reciprocal 
direct investments. Various factors can already be ob-
served having a positive effect on the Cuban economy 
and contributing to faster economic growth, includ-
ing new trade relationships, higher remittances from 
the Cuban diaspora in the United States and strong 
growth in tourism. These trends boost the fundamen-
tally positive expectations that governments and the 
private sector have concerning Cuba’s prospects. 
Cuba’s active diplomacy, which also contributed 
to the 2016 Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement of 
2016 with the EU, creates a basis for closer political 
exchange and expanded economic cooperation. This 
also applies to the industrialised nations, with which 
Havana has to date maintained only restricted rela-
tions on account of the American embargo. The high 
expectations for trade and cooperation that exist in 
the Cuban government, the partner countries and the 
private sector can, however, only be fulfilled under 
certain general conditions. 
Germany and the EU must use the political dia-
logue to show Havana that the updated economic 
model can only attract sustained foreign direct invest-
ment if the conditions lastingly improve. One reason 
why investment in Cuba is seen as risky is its track 
record of frequent changes of political course. From 
the entrepreneurial perspective the existing frame-
work – above all the strong sway of political/adminis-
trative instances and investors’ restricted influence 
over recruitment and pay – incurs high costs that have 
to be redeemed. Foreign investors weigh up very care-
fully whether an investment will be worthwhile, espe-
cially in view of the small size of the Cuban market. 
Havana can only succeed in attracting more invest-
ment if the state’s control over private-sector decisions 
is relaxed. Options such as administrative steering 
of investment and obligatory technology transfer are 
open to a country like China because investors are 
keen to engage on account of the enormous Chinese 
domestic market. Cuba, on the other hand, is so small 
that it will have to bend much more strongly to inter-
national conditions if it is to become an attractive 
investment location in the long-term. 
The EU should not push for rapid privatisation in Cuba, 
because it would not be in the economic or political interests of 
the industrialised countries for the privatisation course to lead 
to monopoly capitalism. The current tendency of the Cuban 
government to slow the development of small private 
businesses and leave important sectors under the con-
trol of the state or the military, sometimes in coopera-
tion with multinationals, creates an unsettling basis 
for privatisation. Cuba must have a great interest in 
avoiding the mistakes made by Russia in the 1990s, 
where rapid wholesale privatisation of state monopo-
lies without corresponding institutional safeguards 
fostered the emergence of monopoly capitalism. That 
danger could be lessened if Cuba permitted the devel-
opment of SMEs to ensure a certain degree of com-
petition. The current promotion of cooperatives cer-
tainly offers Cuba possibilities to pursue a third way 
between market capitalism and socialism. But at the 
same time, strengthening the private sector requires 
the development of institutions such as competition 
agencies and a quality infrastructure to ensure that 
standards are observed. Such institutions must satisfy 
requirements of transparency, impartiality and legal 
security if they are to function properly, and that in 
turn demands a certain degree of autonomy from 
political decisions. In strengthening its institutions 
Cuba can draw on the experience of other countries. 
Here Germany can offer positive and negative experi-
ences gathered during reunification. 
The expansion and diversification of exports sought by 
Cuba will have to build on the existing strengths of the Cuban 
economy. As the objectives of the guidelines indicate, 
this is precisely the line pursued by the Cuban govern-
ment. If, as proposed, exports are to be based more 
strongly on high-tech and a highly qualified workforce, 
greater flexibility for initiative will have to be created 
in this area. Instead, self-employment remains largely 
restricted to low qualifications. In the sphere of ser-
vice exports, tourism has succeeded in increasing its 
contribution to the domestic economy (partly on ac-
count of the small numbers of low-yield cruise visi-
tors). On the other hand the deployment of medical 
personnel abroad generates hard currency and serves 
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political cooperation functions but cannot contribute 
to value added. 
The upcoming dialogue should communicate to Havana 
that it is in Cuba’s interest to make use of all existing possibil-
ities to expand its exports, including the exchange rate. A 
gradual devaluation of the overvalued Cuban peso is 
already a stated objective of the guidelines and is cur-
rently being implemented (albeit slowly). This will 
fundamentally make Cuban goods cheaper in the 
global market and thus contribute to stimulating 
exports. A devaluation could also lead to a reclassifi-
cation in the international income statistics. Rather 
than a political loss of face, this would open possibil-
ities to gain easier access to important markets. Deva-
luation (or even just a more realistic calculation of 
GDP) would allow Cuba to rejoin the EU’s Generalised 
System of Preferences for developing countries and to 
export to the EU on preferential conditions. 
The EU’s Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement and the 
joint German-Cuban declaration should be used actively to 
address human rights questions and the terms for private-
sector engagement. These agreements create the basis 
for the dialogue that will be needed to accompany the 
developments. Germany and the EU should prepare 
and embed the exchange by staging regular consulta-
tions with stakeholders from business, civil society 
and academia. This is useful in the external economic 
sphere because businesses – especially SMEs – face 
considerable challenges where they seek to engage in 
Cuba’s state-directed market. And the area of human 
rights in any case demands dialogue with the in-
formed civil society. 
Including Cuba in selected areas of the Economic Partner-
ship Agreement between the EU and CARIFORUM would create 
a good basis for strengthening the EU’s cooperation with Cuba, 
as well as cooperation among the Caribbean countries. Full 
integration of Cuba in the EPA is currently inconceiv-
able on political, legal and economic grounds. Cuba 
regards the agreement as a neocolonial and neoliberal 
instrument that is not helpful for the region’s inter-
ests. But at the same time Havana fears that the EU’s 
granting of free market access to the EPA partners 
could function to the detriment of other states – in-
cluding Cuba.161 While there is no question of Cuba 
 
161 Roberto Smith, “Balance del Convenio de Lomé en el 
Contexto del Caribe en los Años 90. Algunas Consideraciones 
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(Havanna: Centro de Investigaciones de la Economía Mun-
dial), special issue of Caribe, 2004, 47–61 (57). 
joining the EPA, it could be interested in other forms 
of cooperation; for example the EPA contains numer-
ous possibilities for sectoral cooperation between the 
Caribbean region and the EU including the areas of 
technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards, energy and environment, and cultural co-
operation. Breathing life into these hitherto largely 
neglected cooperation formats is already on the agenda 
anyway; Cuba could be included in some of these 
via CARIFORUM. Germany (in the context of bilateral 
activities) and the EU should identify corresponding 
possibilities in the scope of EPA implementation, in 
coordination with its Caribbean EPA partners. The 
implementation of the Cuban-European Dialogue and 
Cooperation Agreement, which creates the basis for 
bilateral relations, presents no obstacles to this. The 
two channels can both be pursued in coherent form. 
Germany and the EU could strengthen cooperation in the 
region by involving Cuba in regional development programmes. 
Cuba should not be treated as a special case and granted 
bilateral development funds, when all the other Carib-
bean countries receive only regional funds from Ger-
many. Concentration on this bilateral relationship 
cannot be justified by Cuba’s political or economic 
relevance (at best its historical role). Cuba’s political 
role as a valued development donor in the Caribbean 
region would also speak for trilateral cooperation, in 
which Germany and Cuba would conduct joint devel-
opment projects in third countries. 
Fundamentally Cuba’s perspectives will be better 
if it is more closely integrated into global trade and 
investment flows and consolidates its relations with 
the United States. But in the longer term Havana will 
need to send clearer and more coherent economic 
policy messages if it is to realise the potential for 
development offered by trade and investment. Europe 
has a great political and entrepreneurial interest in 
constructively accompanying Cuba along that road. 
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Abbreviations 
ACP African, Caribbean, Pacific (Group of States) 
ACS Association of Caribbean States 
ALADI Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración 
(Latin American Integration Association) 
ALBA Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America 
BNDES Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e 
Social (Brazilian Development Bank) 
CARICOM Caribbean Community 
CARIFORUM Forum of the Caribbean Group of African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EIU The Economist Intelligence Unit 
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GSP Generalised System of Preferences 
GTAI Germany Trade and Invest 
HDI Human Development Index 
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
LAIA Latin American Integration Association 
MINCEX Ministerio del Comercio Exterior y la Inversión 
Extranjera (Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Foreign Investment) 
PCC Partido Comunista de Cuba  
(Communist Party of Cuba) 
SMEs small and medium-sized enterprises 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
